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CRIMINAL LAW-CONFUSION IN THE CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY-THE DOCTRINE OF DIMINISHED CAPACITY AND
THE USE OF MENTAL IMPAIRMENT TO REDU.CE DEGREE OF

MASSACHUSETTs--Commonwealth v. Gould, 1980
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1253, 405 N.E.2d 927.

CONVICTION IN

I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

Facts

Commonwealth v. Gould! involved a defendant with a long
history of severe mental illness2 who brutally murdered3 a former
girlfriend. 4 Defendant was charged with murder under Massachu
setts' first degree murder statute. 5 Three separate types of murder
are incorporated into the statute. Gould was accused of two types:
"Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice afore
thought"6 and murder committed "with extreme atrocity or cru
1. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1253,405 N.E.2d 927.
2. The defendant, Dennis Gould, was treated for mental illness from 1973 until
the time of the murder, July 17, 1978. Id. at 1256, 405 N.E.2d at 929. During this
time he was hospitalized for several periods, including a period beginning in April
1975, when he intentionally amputated his right arm by placing it under the wheels
of a moving trolley car. Id. at 1257 n.6, 405 N.E.2d at 929 n.6. Gould, believing that
he was the new Messiah, suffered from religious delusions. He believed that God
had directed him to kill the victim because she was "impure." Id. at 1257, 405
N.E.2d at 929. When arrested, Gould expressed the opinion that he would not be im
prisoned for his deed, but rather that he would be sent to Israel and crucified. Id. at
1256, 405 N .E.2d at 929.
3. The evidence shows that the defendant furtively waited for the victim outside
her place of employment. As the victim walked toward the building, the defendant
followed her and attacked her with a knife. Id. at 1254, 405 N.E.2d at 928. A
passerby interceded, restrained the defendant, and then left to seek help for the vic
tim. When he returned, the defendant was again stabbing the victim. Id. at 1254, 405
N.E.2d at 928. Death was determined to have been caused by a massive hemorrhage
resulting from 31 stab wounds. Id. at 1255 n.2, 405 N.E.2d at 928 n.2.
4. The victim and the defendant had dated each other regularly for a few
months in 1973. She broke off the relationship when Gould threatened her with a
knife after being overcome by delusions. Id at 1256 n.4, 405 N.E.2d at 929 n.4.
5. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 1 (West 1970) defines murder:
[mlurder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or
with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commis
sion of a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life, is murder in
the first degree. Murder which does not appear to be in the first degree is
murder in the second degree.
6. This category is referred to as deliberately premeditated murder. Conviction
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elty."7 The third type, murder occurring during the "commission
or attempted commission" of a capital crime, 8 was irrelevant to the
case.
The only defense offered was lack of criminal responsibility9
due to Gould's insanity.1o Conflicting expert testimony as to
Gould's sanity was presented at trial by the Commonwealth and by
the defense.ll Could then moved for a directed verdict of not
guilty as to so much of the indictment as charged him with first de
gree murder.12 Could argued that his mental illness precluded him
from formulating the specific intent necessary for conViction of first
degree murder.13 Could alternatively argued that the causal rela
tion between his mental illness and the crime warranted a directed
verdict of not guilty on the first degree murder charge. 14 The

for this type of murder in the first degree requires proof of a specific intent to kill or
to do serious bodily harm which results in death. See Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189
Mass. 457, 486-96, 76 N.E. 127, 138-42 (1905), for an exhaustive discussion of this
category of first degree murder.
7. This category of first degree murder is fairly unique to the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts for it has never been interpreted to include a specific intent ele~
ment. Other jurisdictions, such as California, have statutes which are somewhat simi
lar but whose main difference lies in the requirement of a specific intent to torture.
See CAL. PEN. CODE § 189 (Deering 1970). Conviction for murder in the -first degree,
in the absence of specific intent, had been explained in the Commonwealth as a jus
tifiable reaction to an excessively shocking manner of producing death. See 1980
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1274-75, 405 N.E.2d at 938-39 (Quirico, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part). For an in-depth discussion of murder with extreme atrocity or
cruelty, see notes 65-71 & 126-157 infra and accompanying text.
8. This category is termed "felony murder." See J. NOLAN, 32 MASS. PRAC. §
179 (1976).
9. A person is "criminally responsible" when his mental state is such that he
can be held accountable under the criminal laws for his wrongful actions. See R.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 738-40 (1957).
10. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1258, 405 N.E.2d at 930.
11. Dennis Gould was diagnosed by the expert for the Commonwealth as being
afflicted with "paranoid psychosis." Id. at 1257, 405 N.E.2d at 930. The expert did
not consider Gould's mental impairment to be "substantial." He testified that not
only did Gould know that his acts were illegal when he committed them, but that
Gould was not acting under an irresistible impulse and could have stopped his own
actions.ld. at 1257-58,405 N.E.2d at 930.
Two experts for the defense diagnosed Gould as a "paranoid schizophrenic"
who clearly lacked responsibility. Id. at 1258,405 N.E.2d at 930. One expert testified
that Gould was no longer able to consider the impact of his actions rationally or to
restrain violent urges. ld. at 1259,405 N.E.2d at 930-31. The other expert believed
the murder to be a direct result of Gould's delusion that he was on a divine mission.
Id. at 1259,405 N.E.2d at 931.
12. ld. at 1259,405 N.E.2d at 931.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1259-60,405 N.E.2d at 931.
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motion was denied,15 and a jury convicted Gould of first degree
murder.1s
Gould appealed the verdict on two theories. First, he claimed
that the trial court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict as to
first degree murder constituted reversible error.17 The Massachu
setts Supreme Judicial Court rejected this contention, holding that
a directed verdict would have been an "unwarranted invasion of
the province of the jury"18 for it is the duty of the jury to find the
facts, "including those facts or issues on which they hear psychiat
ric testimony. "19
Gould also appealed pursuant to chapter 278, section 33E of
the Massachusetts General Laws,20 a "safety valve"21 provision that
provides for a general review of all capital cases by the supreme ju
dicial court. 22 It was under the rubric of this general review provi
sion that the supreme judicial court wrestled with the problems
presented by Gould. The court grappled with the conflicts between
such notions as defendant's impaired mental condition and that im
pairment's effect on the specific intent requirement of deliberately
premeditated murder, and the relevance of defendant's state of
mind in relation to murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty, which
traditionally lacked a specific intent element. 23
In an ambiguo1.ls opinion the court attempted to define the ef

15. [d.
16. [d. at 1253,405 N.E.2d at 927.
17. [d. at 1259,405 N.E.2d at 931.
18. [d. at 1260,405 N.E.2d at 931.
19. [d.
20. The relevant statutory provision states:
[i]n a capital case as herein defined the entry [of trial transcripts] in the su
preme judicial court shall transfer to that court the whole case for its consid
eration of the law and the evidence. Upon such consideration the court may,
if satisfied that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, or be
cause of newly discovered evidence, or for any other reason that justice
may require (a) order a new trial or (b) direct the entry of a verdict of a
lesser degree of guilr,1fud remand the case to the superior court for imposi
tion of sentence. For the purpose of such review a capital case shall mean a
case in which the defendant was tried on an indictment for murder in the
first degree and was convi~ted of murder in the first or second degree ....
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1962) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
referred to as § 33E].
21. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1260, 405 N.E.2d at 931 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Brown, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2266, 2282, 380 N.E.2d 113, 120).
22. See note 19 supra.
23. For an analysis of Gould and its implications, see ~otes 91-157 infra and ac
companying text.
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fect of a defendant's mental impairment on the necessary elements
of both deliberately premeditated murder and murder with ex
treme atrocity or cruelty. The supreme judicial court then re
manded the case for a new trial. 24 In so doing the supreme judicial
court may have effected major changes in the Commonwealth's
law, for the court has, in effect, recognized the doctrine of dimin
ished capacity, a defense which reduces a defendant's criminal cul
pability and thus his degree of conviction. 25 The decision also
modifies the established law of murder by extreme atrocity or cru
elty either by adding a specific intent element or by fashioning an
entirely new defense for the crime based on a nebulous standard of
"E:rumess.
.
"26
To understand the implications of Gould it is first necessary to
become familiar with the doctrine of diminished capacity and its
relation to prior Massachusetts law.

B.

Doctrine of Diminished Capacity
Black's Law Dictionary27 defines "diminished responsibility
doctrine" as "[a] misnomer for doctrine under which proof of men
tal derangement short of insanity is submitted as evidence of lack
of deliberate or premeditated design. "28 Also known as the doc
trine of diminished capacity, the concept allows a defendant the
opportunity to produce evidence which tends to negate a specific
mens rea requirement and thus to disprove a necessary element of
the crime. 29 The specific intent element of a crime may be negated
by a showing that an impairment of the defendant's mental capac
ity, induced by disease, defect, or sometimes intoxication, so be
24. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1267, 405 N.E.2d at 935.
25. For a discussion of Gould's effect on the law of deliberately premeditated
murder, see notes 91-125 infra and accompanying text.
26. Gould's effect on murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty is discussed in
notes 125-57 infra and accompanying text.
27. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 545 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
28. ld. at 545.
29. See, e.g., People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379
(1969) (citing People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 318, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815,411 P.2d 911
(1966)). In Mosher, a despondent and intoxicated defendant beat a woman to death.
The California Supreme Court held that "when evidence of diminished capacity has
been introduced, the jury must be instructed that if it finds the defendant could not
harbor malice aforethought because of mental disease, defect, or intoxication the
homicide cannot be an offense higher than manslaughter." ld. at 385, 461 P.2d at
662, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 382. The court recognized that "a proper factual showing of di
minished capacity" may negate the specific intent requisite for robbery, burglary, or
rape. ld. at 392, 461 P.2d at 667, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
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fuddled the actor that he could not form the specific intent to com
mit a particularly defined crime: rather, the actor could only
formulate a general intent to do some wrong that was then mani
fested by his particular act. 30
Jurisdictions that have adopted the doctrine 31 generally have
structured it along one of two lines. 32 The United States v.
Brawner33 approach, followed by Califomia34 and formerly by the
District of Columbia,35 allows a defendant to produce evidence of
his inability to formulate specific intent in all crimes having a de
fined mens rea element. 36 Other jUrisdictions, however, limit the
doctrine by applying it only to crimes that involve specific intent
and which provide multiple degrees of conviction, such as homi
. cide. 37 Several jurisdictions have simply rejected the doctrine. 38
C.

History of Diminished Capacity Doctrine in Massachusetts

Massachusetts, in effect, had rejected the doctrine of dimin
ished capacity as early as 1914 in Comrrwnwealth v. Cooper. 39
30. For example, assume that D, a mentally retarded person, is unintentionally
slighted by V. D's reaction is to wait outside V's home. When V arrives, D fatally
stabs V to teach V to "be nice." Although an objective survey of the facts tends to
show deliberate premeditation as evidenced by D's "lying in wait" for V with a
knife, D may negate this showing of deliberate premeditation by proving, for in
stance, that he does not understand the concept of death. D then may be convicted
of a lesser crime, such as second degree murder or manslaughter, because he in
tended his actions and those actions produced V's death. Since D was incapable of
understanding that death is not a reversible condition, however, a conviction of mur
der in the first degree would not be permitted because D was incapable of harboring
a specific intent to kill V.
31. See G. MORRIS, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE
REFORM 97-126 (1975); Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases For Purposes
Other Than the Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051 (1975).
32. See Comment, Diminished Capacity-Recent Decisions and an Analytical
Approach, 30 VAND. L. REV. 213 (1977).
33. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
34. See People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949); People v. Mosher,
1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969); People v. Taylor, 220 Cal. App.
2d 212, 33 Cal. Rptr. 654 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
35. 471 F.2d at 969 (rejected by the court in Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d
64 (D.C. 1976)).
36. See 471 F.2d at 1002; Comment, supra note 31, at 215-17.
37. Comment, supra note 32, at 217-19.
38. Some confusion exists as to exactly which states have rejected the doctrine.
Compare G. MORRIS, supra note 31, at 97-126 with Lewin, note 31, at 1105-15 and
Comment, supra note 32, at 222-23 n.46.
39. 219 Mass. 1, 106 N.E. 545 (1914). Cooper shot his lover's paramour three
times in the back. His defense was that he was suffering from a mental disorder,
which he termed a "constitutional inferiority" that "carries with it a limited, that is, a
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There the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court flatly stated that,
"If found to be irresponsible the defendant was entitled to a ver
dict of not guilty by reason of insanity; but his irresponsibility
would not reduce the degree of crime. "40 More than fifty years
later the court echoed this rationale by holding that a defendant's
claim that he was "incapable of deliberate premeditation because of
mental disease . . . must fail since such a defense is not recognized
in this jurisdiction. "41
The supreme judicial court also applied that same rule to cases
involving mental retardation and organic, rather than psychotic,
disorders. In Commonwealth v. Mazza,42 a mentally handicapped
person was convicted of first degree murder. On appeal defendant
urged the court to recognize the defense of diininished capacity.
based on mental retardation, as opposed to mental illness, through
the discretionary powers granted by section 33E. 43 The court
dismissed the appeal, adhering to the view "that there is no inter
mediate stage of partial criminal responsibility between insanity and
ordinary responsibility as defined by statute."44
The supreme judicial court, however, has allowed the some
what related partial defense of intoxication to negate the specific
intent element of murder committed with deliberately premedi
tated malice aforethought. 45 This defense, though, has been lim
diminished degree of responsibility for the act." Id. at 4, 106 N.E. at 547. This con
tention was rejected by the court. Id.

40. Id. at 5, 106 N.E. at 547 (emphasis added).
41. Commonwealth v. Sires, 370 Mass. 541, 547, 350 N.E.2d 460, 465 (1976).
But see Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 237, 372 N.E.2d 246, in
which the court reduced a verdict of murder in the first degree to murder in the sec
ond degree in a case discussing the psychological and sociological features of the
"battered child syndrome"; Comment, Commonwealth v. Cadwell: Deliberate Pre
meditation, Extreme Atrocity and Cruelty, and the Battered Child Syndrome-A
New Look At Criminal Culpability in Massachusetts, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 812
(1979).
42. 366 Mass. 30, 313 N.E.2d 875 (1974). The defendant had an I.Q. of 77, was
unable to understand material beyond the second-grade level, and was a functional
illiterate. Id. at 32, 313 N.E.2d at 877.
43. See note 20 supra for the relevant provisions of § 33E.
44. 366 Mass. at 33,313 N.E.2d at 878.
45. See Commonwealth v. Delle Chiaie, 323 Mass. 615, 84 N.E.2d 7 (1949), in
which the defendant claimed to have become extremely drunk at a wedding. The ev
idence showed that he lured a seven-year-old girl into a parking lot and attempted to
rape her. When she screamed, he crushed her skull with a rock. Defendant later con
fessed and was convicted of murder in the first degree. On appeal he unsuccessfully
argued that the trial judge erred in not giving the jury an instruction that intoxication
is a mitigating factor of felony murder. The trial judge, however, instructed the jury
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ited to use against deliberately premeditated first degree murder:
it has not been applied to felony-murder or first degree murder
involving extreme atrocity or cruelty.46 The court has always been
careful to distinguish the partial defense of intoxication from any
notion of diminished capacity based upon mental disease or defect
by holding that insanity, if found, is a complete defense; whereas
intoxication may not completely exonerate the intoxicated actor. 47
The court has justified this distinction by characterizing the intoxi
cation defense as "merely an application of the ordinary rules of
law pertaining to the requisite mental state for conviction of a par
ticular crime charged. "48 Thus, the supreme judicial court seems to
view the intoxication defense as an internal device inherent in the
definition of deliberately premeditated murder and other specific
mens rea crimes. On the other hand, the court views the insanity
defense as an external device which may be imposed as a bar to
conviction of any crime.

D.

The Massachusetts Insanity Rule-MeHoul
In the absence of the doctrine of diminished capacity, the is
sue of a mentally handicapped defendant's criminal responsibility
had been determined in Massachusetts through the application of
the two-pronged test of Commonwealth v. McHoul. 49 Under the
McHoul test, a person is not criminally responsible if his mental
condition renders him incapable of appreciating the difference be
tween right and wrong or, even if he retains the capacity to distin
guish between right and wrong, his condition renders him unable
to control his actions. 50 This test has not been interpreted to allow

that intoxication could be used to negate the specific intent element of deliberately
premeditated first degree murder. The instruction was upheld by the supreme judi
cial court. [d. at 617-18, 84 N.E.2d at 8-9. See note 124 infra for the instruction given
in Delle Chiaie.
46. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 374 Mass. 453, 373 N.E.2d 1121
(1978). In this felony-murder case, the defendant urged the use of § 33E to establish
a defense of diminished capacity based upon voluntary intoxication along the lines of
the liberal California rule. See note 29 supra for a discussion of th~ California rule.
The supreme judicial court rejected this plea and refused to extend the defense of
intoxication to felony murder. [d. at 460-65,373 N.E.2d at 1125-27.
47. See, e.g., 374 Mass. 453, 462-64, 373 N.E.2d 1121, 1125-27 (1978); 366
Mass. at 34, 313 N.E.2d at 878.
48. 366 Mass. at 34, 313 N.E.2d at 878.
49. 352 Mass. 544, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967). The second part of this test is known
as the "irresistible impulse" rule. [d. at 546, 226 N.E.2d at 557.
50. [d. at 546, 226 N .E.2d at 557.
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mental impairment to negate a specific mens rea element of a par
ticular crime charged. 51
The court in McHoul, however, did state that this two
pronged test is basically the same rule as the one embodied in sec
tion 4.01 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code: 52 "we
regard the [Model Penal] Code definition as an evolutionary re
statement of our rule . . . . "53 The Model Penal Code states that
"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks sub
stantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. "54
McHoul and subsequent Massachusetts decisions came to
stand for the proposition that an insanity defense, if accepted by
the jury, would exonerate the defendant entirely; but it could not
reduce his degree of conviction. 55 Thirteen years after McHoul, a
reconstituted court56 rejected McHoul's basic premis&-that insan
ity is an all-or-nothing defense.
E.

Gould-The Decision

The majority opinion, written by Justice Abrams, focused on
two issues: Whether Gould's mental capacity rendered him unable
to deliberately premeditate 57 and whether Gould's mental capacity
should be considered in determining whether the murder was
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. While finding the trial
record free from error, the supreme judicial court sustained
Gould's appeal under the general supervisory powers of section
33E and ordered a new trial. 58 At the new trial, in addition to hav
51. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sires, 370 Mass. 541,350 N.E.2d 460 (1976), in
which the defendant argued that psychiatric testimony "should be admissible in or
der to prove that the defendant was incapable of deliberate premeditation because of
mental disease." [d. at 547, 350 N.E.2d at 465. The court concluded, "His claim
must fail since such a defense is not recognized in this jurisdiction." [d.
52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
53. 352 Mass. at 547, 226 N .E.2d at 558.
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, at 66 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
55. The stated purpose of the McHoul test is to foreclose any possibility of
criminal sanctions being imposed upon mentally handicapped defendants. 352 Mass.
at 552, 226 N.E.2d at 561. This intent precludes the doctrine of diminished capacity
which does impose criminal sanctions, to a lesser degree, upon such mentally
handicapped defendants.
56. The justices who decided McHoul were: Wilkins, C.J., Whittemore, Cutter,
Spiegel, and Reardon, JJ. The justices on the Gould court included: Hennessey, C.J.,
Quirico, Braucher, Kaplan, Wilkens, Liacos, and Abrams, JJ.
57. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1254,405 N.E.2d at 928.
58. [d. at 1261,405 N.E.2d at 932. All justices agreed to order a new trial, but
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ing psychiatric testimony applied to the issues of whether defend
ant was able to distinguish between right and wrong and whether
he was acting under an irresistible impulse, Gould will be per
mitted to "produce expert testimony on the issue of whether or not
the impairment of his mental processes precluded him from being
able to deliberately premeditate. "59
In holding that a jury should consider a defendant's mental ill
ness to determine whether he possessed the mental capacity neces
sary to deliberately premeditate, the court analogized Gould to
cases involving use of the partial defense of intoxication. 6o The
court reasoned that it would be incongruous to allow the jury to
consider the effect of mental impairment when the defendant has
voluntarily impaired his mental awareness, thus making him unable
to deliberately premeditate murder, but to prevent the jury from
considering mental capacity in cases involving an involuntary im
pairment resulting from mental illness. 61 The court flatly rejected
the argument that a defendant's mental illness should be used
solely to prove lack of criminal responsibility and not to disprove
specific intent. 62 The court overruled all prior Massachusetts deci
sions which interpreted McHoul 63 as precluding consideration of
mental illness to negate specific intent. 64
The court further held that henceforth juries should "also con
sider the defendant's mental impairment on the issue of whether
he committed the murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty. "65 This'
is an odd holding since Comrrwnwealth v. Gilbert,66 cited as sup
port in Gould, and all subsequent Massachusetts decisions 67 have
held that the crime of murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty
does not include a specific mens rea element which may be
negated by mental illness. The issue presented in Commonwealth
Justice Quirico, joined by Chief Justice Hennessey, disagreed with the majority's ra
tionale. Id. at 1268,405 N.E.2d at 935 (Quirico, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part).
59. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1254,405 N.E.2d at 928.
60. Id. at 1261-62, 405 N.E.2d at 932. For a discussion of the intoxication de
fense, see notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text.
61. Id. at 1262,405 N.E.2d at 932.
62. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1263,405 N.E.2d at 933.
63. See text accompanying notes 50-56 supra for a discussion of McHoul.
64. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1263,405 N.E.2d at 933.
65. Id. at 1254,405 N.E.2d at 928.
66. 165 Mass. 45, 42 N.E. 336 (1895) (cited as support in Commonwealth v.
Gould, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1265,405 N.E.2d at 934).
67. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golston, 378 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Lacy, 371 Mass. 363,358 N.E.2d 419 (1976).
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v. Gilbert 68 was whether "knowledge that the act of killing was

at~

tended with extreme atrocity or cruelty" was required for convic
tion. 69 The court answered in the negative:
We do not think this special knowledge of the character of
the act is an element which enters into the statutory description
of a murder committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. The in
telligence and mental capacity requisite for the commission of
murder were found 'to exist. Knowledge that the crime was ex
tremely atrocious or cruel is not required. If the prisoner was a
responsible agent, the statute providing that murder committed
with extre~e atrocity or cruelty is murder in the first degree
calls for no greater degree of knowledge than is required for a

conviction of murder in the second degree. 70

Although specific intent need not be shown, certain factors
may be considered in a particular case to determine whether a
murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. Relevant
factors include the victim's consciousness and degree of suffering,
the extent of physical injury, the method employed to inflict death,
indifference to the victim's pain, and the disproportion between
the means actually used and the means capable of inflicting
death. 71
The Gould court stressed that in some cases the defendant's
pleasure in the torture or destruction of his victim is relevant to
the issue of whether a murder was committed with extreme atroc
ity or cruelty. 72 The court ignored the fact that extreme atrocity or
cruelty cases reject the need for such a sadistic frame of mind. 73
68. 165 Mass. at 45,42 N.E. at 336.
69. Id. at 58, 42 N.E. at 338.
70. Id. at 58-59, 42 N.E. at 338 (emphasis added). See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at
1274, 405 N.E.2d at 938 (Quirico, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Use
of the phrase "responsible agent" also connotes the all-or-nothing application of an
insanity defense.
71. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golston, 378 Mass. 249, 260, 366 N.E.2d 744,
752 (1977); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 356 Mass. 617, 628, 255 N.E.2d 191, 198
(1970).
72. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1265, 405 N.E.2d at 934.
73. The court cited Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744
(1977), as support for this proposition. In that case an 18-year-old black defendant
snuck up behind a 34-year-old white man who was walking toward his car and
crushed his skull with one blow from a baseball bat. The defendant stated that he
did it "for kicks." Defendant objected to the submission to the jury of th~ issue of
extreme atrocity or cruelty. Id. at 260, 366 N.E.2d at 752. The court stressed the tra
ditional factor of indifference to the victim's suffering but never implied a "malicious
. mind" requirement. On the contrary, the court felt that "there is no requirement that
the defendant know that his act was extremely atrocious or cruel, and no require
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The supreme judicial court reasoned that if a "malicious mind" is
relevant to the issue of extreme atrocity or cruelty "then fairness
requires that an impaired mind may also be considered. "74 Consid
eration of an impaired mind was viewed by the court as being "es
sential" to distinguish "extreme atrocity or cruelty" as a statutory
definition of first degree murder "from that atrocity or cruelty inev
itably included in the destruction of any human life."75 The court
concluded its opinion with a suggested jury instruction on the issue
of extreme atrocity or cruelty that surprisingly did not mention as a
relevant factor the defendant's taking pleasure in the destruction of
his victim. 76
Justice Quirico, joined by Chief Justice Hennessey, concurred
in the decision to grant a new trial but disagreed with the majori
ty's reasoning as to both the deliberate premeditation issue and the
extreme atrocity or cruelty issue. 77 These justices felt that a new
trial was necessary on the basis of the simple unspoken premise
that they believed Gould to be legally insane and thus beyond the
purview of criminal sanctions. They stated that upon review of all
the testimony regarding Gould's sanity they could not conclude
that there was "no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice"
under the facts of the case. 78 They decided that, although one psy
chiatrist's testimony supported the verdict of the jury, there may
have been an error "in the determination of . . . [Gould's] mental

ment of deliberate premeditation." Id. at 260, 366 N.E.2d at 752. Furthermore, the
court also considered other traditional factors in reaching its decision. ld. at 260, 366
N .E.2d at 752.
74. ld. at 1265, 405 N.E.2d at 934.
75. Id. at 1267, 405 N.E.2d at 935.
76. Hereafter, in addition to the traditional instructions on extreme atrocity
or cruelty the judge may also instruct the jurors that if they find from the ev
idence that the defendant had substantially reduced mental capacity at the
time the crime was committed, they may consider what effect, if any, the de
fendant's impaired capacity had on his ability to appreciate the conse
quences of his choices. Thus, the defendant's mental impairment is to be
weighed in evaluating the evidence of the manner and means of inflicting
death, the instrumentalities employed, any disproportion between the means
actually needed to inflict death and those employed, the consciousness and
degree of suffering of the victim, and the extent of the victim's physical inju
ries, factors customarily associated with extreme atrocity or cruelty.
ld. at 1267 n.16, 405 N.E.2d at 935 n.16. But see id. at 1265-66,405 N.E.2d at 934-35,
in which the court seemed to stress the defendant's indifference to his victim's suf
fering.
77. Id. at 1268, 405 N.E.2d at 935 (Quirico, J., concurring in part & dissenting
in part).
78. Id. at 1269,405 N.E.2d at 936.
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competence and criminal responsibility for his acts, "79 for the
greater weight of all the evidence, including nonpsychiatric testi
mony, pointed to a holding that Gould was insane at the time of
his actions. 80
The majority's rationale analogizing insanity to the defense of
intoxication was criticized as being a de facto adoption of dimin
ished capacity, a doctrine defendant expressly argued be adopted.
As Justice Quirico pointed out, diminished capacity had been re
jected continually in recent years by the supreme judicial court. 81
Justice Quirico concluded, however, that the majority's implicit
recognition of the doctrine of diminished capacity was superfluous
because the burden of proving deliberate premeditation as an ele
ment of first degree murder has always been on the Common
wealth, and when an insanity defense has been raised "that impli
edly includes the burden of proving that the defendant had the
capacity to deliberately premeditate the homicide before
committing it. "82 Once the prosecution has shown the defendant
not to be insane within the meaning of McHoul, however, the
prosecution has necessarily shown that the defendant possessed the
capacity to deliberately premeditate. 83 Justice Quirico noted that
he believed sufficient evidence existed to properly submit the issue
of deliberately premeditated first degree murder to the jury. 84
Justice Quirico's disagreement with the majority as to the ex
treme atrocity or cruelty issue was even more pronounced. He
characterized the court's action as "a judicial attempt to rewrite a
legislative definition of what constitutes one of the three types of

79. ld. at 1270,405 N.E.2d at 937 (emphasis added).
80. ld. at 1269,405 N.E.2d at 936.
81. ld. at 1268,405 N.E.2d at 936. For a brief history of the doctrine of dimin
ished capacity in Massachusetts, see text accompanying notes 39-48 supra.
82. ld. at 1269,405 N.E.2d at 936 (Quirico, ]., concurring in part & dissenting
in part).
83. Since McHoul established insanity as an all-or-nothing defense, evidence of
mental impairment should be irrelevant to the issue of deliberate premeditation once
the prosecution has prevailed on the "insanity" issue. See text accompanying notes
49-56 supra for a discussion of McHoul. But see text accompanying notes 91-157 in
fra for an analysis of Gould's effect on McHoul.
84. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1268, 405 N .E.2d at 935. Justice Quirico thought
that the evidence was sufficient to submit the issues of deliberate premeditation and
extreme atrocity and cruelty to the jury but believed that the jury had made the
wrong decision on the basis of that evidence in not finding Dennis Gould to be in
sane. For this reason Justice Quirico decided that the case should be remanded for a
new trial. ld. at 1268, 405 N.E.2d at 935 (Quirico, J., concurring in part & dissenting
in part).
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murder in the first degree. "85 He felt that the court was applying
the doctrine of diminished capacity by allowing the same evidence
regarding mental impairment that currently may be used to negate
the specific intent element of deliberately premeditated first de
gree murder to be employed to reduce a conviction for first degree
murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty.86 Using evidence which
may negate specific intent to determine the issue of extreme atroc
ity or cruelty implies that the crime includes a specific intent ele
ment. 87
He noted that such a proposition has been rejected by the
court since 1895 88 and that the legislature intended to impose the
maximum punishment solely upon proof of one fact: That the man
ner in which death was inflicted was excessively shocking or pain
ful. 89 In Justice Quirico's view, the cOurt's decision extinguishes
the difference between the type of murder in the first degree fo
cusing upon the defendant's specific intent, defined as deliberate
premeditation, from the type focusing upon the particular means
used by the defendant to kill, characterized as extreme atrocity or
cruelty.90 To Justice Quirico, such action should be left to the leg
islature.
II.

ANALYSIS

Effect of Gould on the Law of Deliberately
Premeditated Murder
Gould at first appears to be a correct interpretation of the
McHoul theory that section 4.0l of the Model Penal Code is an
"evolutionary restatement" of Massachusetts law. 91 In Gould, the
supreme judicial court held that psychiatric testimony may be of
fered to negate the specific intent requirement of deliberately pre
meditated murder just as evidence of intoxication may be offered
A.

85.
86.

[d. at 1273,405 N.E.2d at 938.
[d. at 1271-72,405 N.E.2d at 937.

87. [d. at 1271, 405 N.E.2d at 937. See notes 130-35 infra and accompanying
text for an analysis of the implied addition of specific intent into the crime of murder
with extreme atrocity or cruelty.
88. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1273-74,405 N.E.2d at 938-39 (Quirico, J., concur
ring in part & dissenting in part). See Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 165 Mass. at 45, 42
N .E. at 336, discussed at notes 66-71 supra and accompanying text.
89. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1275,405 N.E.2d at 939 (Quirico, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part).
90. Id. at 1274,405 N.E.2d at 939.
91. 352 Mass. at 547,226 N.E.2d at 558.
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to negate specific intent. 92 In support of this position the court
quoted a passage from United States v. Brawner,93 decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
1972, in which the Model Penal Code rule was adopted and was
liberally construed. 94 The court probably95 found Brawner's inter
pretation of the Model Penal Code to be applicable in interpreting
the McHoul test because the McHoul test assertedly parallels sec
tion 4.01 of the Model Penal Code. 96 In this way the supreme ju
dicial court may be viewed as remaining consistent with the
McHoul rationale in its recent overruling of Massachusetts deci
sions that interpreted McHoul as rejecting any Brawner-like ap
proach. 97 Gould also may be considered as a correct interpretation
of McHoul in that the Gould court categorically.denied that its
holding adopted the doctrine of diminished capacity,98 a doctrine
not mentioned in McHoul. 99
Closer examination, however, reveals that Gould effects a sub
92.1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262,405 N.E.2d at 932.
93. Neither logic nor justice can tolerate a jurisprudence that defines the
elements of an offense as requiring a mental state such that one defendant
can properly argue that his voluntary drunkenness removed his capacity to
form the specific intent but another defendant is inhibited from a submis
sion of his contention that an abnormal mental condition, for which he was
in no way responsible, negated his capacity to form a specific intent even
though the condition did not exonerate him from all criminal responsibility.
ld. at 1262, 405 N.E.2d at 932 (citing United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 999)
(footnotes omitted).
94. In Brawner, the court of appeals, sitting en bane, reversed the defendant's
conviction that had been obtained through the application of the "Durham test" for
insanity. Under the Durham rule, a person is not responsible for his criminal actions
if those actions were the product of mental disease or defect. 471 F.2d at 976. The
court rejected the Durham rule in order to depart from its "product" formulation,
which had allowed expert witnesses to dominate trials because it required a precise
medical definition of the defendant's mental condition. ld. at 1011 (Bazelon, C.].,
concurring in part & dissenting in part). After conducting the exhaustive analysis of
the use of insanity as a defense, and after considering the alternatives, the court
adopted the American Law Institute (MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01) insanity test. ld.
at 973-94.
95. The court does not clearly explain why it abandoned Massachusetts prece
dent and embraced the Brawner approach.
96. 352 Mass. at 547, 226 N.E.2d at 558 (discussed in the text accompanying
notes 50-52 supra).
97. Prior Massachusetts cases which rejected the Brawner approach and which
are now overruled include, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sires, 370 Mass. 541, 350 N.E.2d
460 (1976); Commonwealth v. Costa, 360 Mass. 177,274 N.E.2d 802 (1971).
98. "Permitting a jury to consider whether a defendant's mental illness affected
his capacity to deliberately premeditate is not tantamount to adopting a doctrine of
diminished responsibility." 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262,405 N.E.2d at 932.
99. See 352 Mass. at 546-55,226 N.E.2d at 557-63.
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stantial change in Massachusetts law. While disavowing the adop
tion of diminished capacity, the court held that jurors should
"consider the defendant's mental illness on the degree of murder
or on the issue of specific intent. "100 The court's disclaimer not
withstanding, this is obViously the definition of diminished re
sponsibility: "Doctrine under which mental derangement short of
insanity is submitted as evidence of lack of premeditated de
sign. "101 The court used language that allows mental illness to be
considered either in relation to the degree of crime or to specific
intent. This also indicates that the court took the more liberal of
the two possible approaches to diminished capacity, the Brawner
approach,102 and rejected the more limited approach of applying
the doctrine only to crimes involving multiple degrees distin
guished by specific intent. loa
Because Gould relies upon and parallels Brawner's rationale,
the supreme judicial court's statements that it did not adopt dimin
ished capacity and that it adhered to McHoul must be questioned.
Following Brawner undermines the court's assertions, for Brawner
rejected use of the term "diminished capacity," but it did not re
ject the rationale underlying the doctrine. 104 Indeed, the supreme
judicial court quoted from a section of Brawner entitled: "Mental
Condition, though insufficient to exonerate, TrUly be relevant to
specific mental element of certain crimes or degrees of crime."105
That section heading is a definition of the doctrine of diminished
capacity. It is also clearly contrary to the precise intent of the

100. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1263,405 N.E.2d at 933.
101. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 27, at 545. See note 28 supra and
accompanying text.
102. See also notes 31-38 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
two approaches to diminished capacity.
103. Id.
104. Our discussion accompanies the redefinition of when a mental condi
tion exonerates a defendant from criminal responsibility with the doctrine
that expert testimony as to a defendant's abnormal mental condition may be
received and considered, as tending to show, in a responsible way, that de
fendant did not have the specific mental state required for a particular crime
or degree of crime-even though he was aware that his act was wrongful
and was able to control it, and hence was not entitled to complete exonera
tion.
Some of the cases following this doctrine use the term "diminished respon
sibility," but we prefer the example of the cases that avoid this term ... for
its convenience is outweighed by its confusion....
471 F.2d at 998 (footnotes omitted).
105. Id. at 998 (emphasis in original).
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McHoul test, which is to exonerate those defendants whose mental
condition has rendered them unable to control their actions and to
remove them entirely from any possibility of criminal sanctions. lOS
More importantly, the supreme judicial court may have mis
placed its trust by adopting the Brawner approach because, as the
court neglected to mention in its decision, Brawner has been re
jected in the District of Columbia by Bethea v. United States. 107
Since Gould relies upon Brawner, some of the criticisms of
Brawner found in Bethea may be applicable to Gould. Such criti
cisms include the fact that the Brawner holding was premised
upon a theory "which may be characterized as logical relevance"108
for the case held that, if evidence of reduced criminal responsibil
ity is relevant in cases involving intoxication,109 similar evidence
logically must be relevant in cases involving mental illness. 110
Gould parrots this reasoning. 1ll
Bethea rejected this premise because "The asserted analogy is
flawed . . . by the fact that there are significant evidentiary distinc
tions between psychiatric abnormality and the recognized incapac
itating circumstances, [such as intoxication or epilepsy]. "112 "Ole
main distinction is that the latter incapacitating conditions may be
quantified or objectively demonstrated and may be understood by
lay witnesses and juries, whereas psychiatric testimony as to insan
ity is often complex and confusing. 1l3 Another distinction cited by
Bethea that tends to destroy the logic of diminished capacity is the
106. 352 Mass. at 552, 266 N.E.2d at 561. Moreover, it was further stated that:
The principle of criminal irresponsibility embodied in the [Massachusetts]
rule and in the [Model Penal] Code is to maintain the general and specific
deterrent effect of criminal penalties for wrong conduct, subject only to rec
ognition of the injustice of punishing those lacking the capacity to appreci
ate the wrongfulness of, or to control, their behavior.
Id. at 555, 266 N.E.2d at 563. Thus, the term "capacity" as defined in McHoul refers
to a defendant's ability to recognize or to control illegal behavior: it is not relevant to
a defendant's ability to formulate a specific intent or to his degree of culpability.
107. 365 A.2d 64 (D.C. 1976). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals re
jected the Brawner rule, holding that cases in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia decided after the District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 11-101 to 11-2504 (1973),
are not controlling precedent. Id at 70-72. The court further held that the adoption of
the doctrine in Brawner was mere dictum. Id. at 85.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Delle Chiaie, 323 Mass. 615, 84 N.E.2d 7
(1949), discussed in note 45 supra.
110. 471 F.2d at 999. See also Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d at 85-86.
Ill. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262,405 N.E.2d at 932.
112. 365 A.2d at 88.
113. Id. at 88.
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difference between the concept of mens rea, which refers to the
usually inferred existence of a "guilty mind," from the concept of
insanity, which "connotes a presumption that a particular individ
uallacks the capacity to possess such a [guilty] state of mind. "114
The Bethea court also noted that adoption of diminished ca
pacity is likely to produce "variable or sliding scales of criminal re
sponsibility. "115 The court's main objection, though, was to Brawn
er's reversal of "traditional legal theory"; prior to Brawner the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had al
ways rejected "any notion of partial insanity."11G
Prior to Gould, "any notion of partial insanity"117 had been
rejected by the Massachusetts courts. HS The fact that Gould
expressly overruled in a summary fashion an entire line of cases
interpreting and applying McHoul to mean that insanity is a com
plete defense to criminal charges or no defense at all 119 is strong
testimony that Gould redefines the principles of McHoul.
From this analysis it may be concluded that despite the court's
statement to the contrary120 the decision in Gould does, in effect,
adopt the doctrine of diminished capacity. The doctrine is rooted
in the court's decision to allow a jury to consider mental impair
ment in relation to the issue of specific intent, not just to the issue
of insanity.
Since the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has followed
the Brawner approach as to the extent of the doctrine of dimin
ished capacity, 121 the new rule in Massachusetts appears to be that
evidence of mental impairment which is occasioned by mental ill
ness or defect, or by intoxication may be presented to, and consid
ered by, the jury in order to negate the specific intent element of a
particular crime. 122
Justice Quirico's characterization of Gould as representing "no
114. Id. at 87.
115. Id. at 88.
116. Id. at 86.
117. Id.
118. See notes 39-48 supra and accompanying text for a brief history of dimin
ished capacity in the Commonwealth.
119. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1263, 405 N.E.2d at 933. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Monsen, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 309, 385 N.E.2d 984 (1979); Commonwealth v. Lacy,
371 Mass. 363, 358 N.E.2d 419 (1976); Commonwealth v. Costa, 360 Mass. 177,274
N.E.2d 802 (1971).
120. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262,405 N.E.2d at 932.
12l. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of the
Brawner approach.
122. This rule applies regardless of whether the specific intent crime is defined
in multiple degrees. Id.
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great change in our law"123 with respect to the specific intent re
quirement of deliberately premeditated first degree murder124 may
be too lenient, for Gould departs drastically from prior case law.
Gould rejects the premise that insanity, as opposed to intoxication,
is an all-or-nothing defense, a premise at the foundation of prior
Massachusetts common law. 125 The rejection of this premise is par
ticularly clear when considering that part of the decision that deals
with the issue of murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty.
B.

Effect of Gould on Murder with Extreme Atrocity or Cruelty

In Gould the court held that juries should consider the effect
of mental illness on a defendant in deciding whether a murder was
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty,126 The court reasoned
that a jury's verdict
will more accurately reflect the community's conscience, goals,
and norms, if the jurors are not arbitrarily restricted to consider
ing only the defendant's course of action, but are also permitted
to consider the defendant's peculiar mental state as an additional
factor to be weighed in determining whether the murder was
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. 127

This decision to consider a defendant's mental condition was,
again, based on "logical relevance. "128 "Surely, if a malicious mind

123. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1269,405 N.E.2d at 936 (Quirico, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part).
124. The change in the law of deliberately premeditated murder would be a
jury instntction "in accordance with" the instruction found in Commonwealth v.
Delle Chiaie, 323 Mass. 615, 84 N.E.2d 7 (1949). Commonwealth v. Gould, 1980
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1264,405 N.E.2d at 933. The instntction in Delle Chiaie related to
the issue of the intoxication but it is easily adapted to the issue of mental illness:
[oln the question of murder in the first degree deliberately premeditated ...
if you are satisfied upon the evidence that the defendant killed the deceased
but that he was incapable of conceiving a deliberately premeditated inten
tion to kill because of intoxication, then he is not guilty of murder in the
first degree, but he is guilty of murder in the second degree. That is because
deliberate premeditation is required there, and if a man is so overcome by
liquor that he is incapable of deliberately premeditating, then the law says,
out of kindness to him in that situation, that he is not guilty of murder in the
first degree but he is guilty of murder in the second degree.
323 Mass. at 617-18,84 N.E.2d at 8-9.
125. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
126. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1267,405 N.E.2d at 934-35.
127. Id. at 1266,405 N.E.2d at 934 (footnote omitted).
128. United States v. Bethea, 365, A.2d at 85. See notes 112-16 supra and ac
companying text for an explanation of Bethea's "logical relevance" theory.
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may be considered as evidence that a defendant committed a mur
der with extreme atrocity or cruelty, then fairness requires that an
impaired mind may also be considered as evidence bearing on
whether or not the defendant committed the murder with extreme
atrocity or cruelty. "129
This decision in effect reads a specific intent element into the
crime: if specific intent were not present, a defendant's mental im
pairment would be irrelevant to the issue of extreme atrocity or
cruelty130 since the crime otherwise requires only general in
tent. 131 To hold that juries may consider mental capacity, yet to
maintain that there is no specific intent element to murder by ex
treme atrocity or cruelty, gives the consideration of mental impair
ment the same effect as a total insanity defense. It assumes this
quality because mental impairment, if found to have affected the
defendant's conduct, could only relate to the negation of general
criminal intent, thus rendering the defendant criminally irresponsi
ble. The Gould court, however, did not hold that mental impair
ment should render the defendant criminally irresponsible; rather,
it held that the defendant should be held responsible to a lesser
degree. Since Comnwnwealth v. Cooper 132 previously established
that irresponsibility cannot reduce the degree of crime, the only
logical explanation for reducing the degree of conviction must be
defendant's lack of specific intent to torture or mutilate. Thus, if
Cooper is still good law, and it can be argued that it is,133 the ad
dition of a specific intent element into murder with extreme atroc
ity or cruelty is an inescapable implication of Gould. The addition

129. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1265,405 N.E.2d at 934.
130. The Gould court stated that a "defendant's peculiar mental state" is to be
considered by a jury in determining -.yhether a murder has been committed with ex
treme atrocity or cruelty. [d. at 1266, 405 N.E.2d at 934.
131. See notes 66-71 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the ele
ments of murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty.
132. 219 Mass. at 1, 106 N.E. at 545, which is discussed in notes 39-41 supra
and accompanying text.
133. The court in Gould asserts that it is not adopting the doctrine of dimin
ished capacity. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262,405 N.E.2d at 932. This assertion is con
sistent with the holding of Cooper, which is discussed in notes 39-41 supra and ac
companying text. In its discussion of the deliberate premeditation issue, the court
further stated it had merely applied the" ·ordinary rules of law' " in relation to the
mens rea necessary for conviction of a particular crime. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1261,
405 N.E.2d at 932. This statement is also consistent with the Cooper holding, for
Cooper applies only to a finding of irresponsibility and not to a lack of specific in
tenl. Finally, the court in Gould did not expressly overrule Cooper as it did overrule
other cases. [d. at 1263,405 N.E.2d at 933.
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of a specific intent element, however, clearly contradicts estab
lished theory and necessarily invalidates a mass of legal prece
dent. 134 It would appear, then, that this decision is indeed an "at
tempt to rewrite a legislative definition of what constitutes one of
the three types of murder in the first degree. "135
The supreme judicial court now has three avenues of interpre
tation open to it when Gould is applied to future cases involving
murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty. First, the court could ig
nore its own statement denying adoption of diminished capacity
and openly apply the doctrine with full knowledge of its effect on
prior Massachusetts case law. 13G Second, the court could apply the
doctrine while denying its- use, as it did in Gould. This technique
allows the court to limit decisions to the facts of the particular case
should the doctrine or its surreptitious use prove to be un
workable. 137 Finally, the court simply could embrace its denial, re
pudiate the doctrine, and attempt to reconcile Gould with prior
case law. Because of the possibility that the court might take one of
the latter two avenues, particularly the latter, Gould may have a
secondary impact on the Massachusetts law of murder with ex
treme atrocity or cruelty. If the court chooses not to apply dimin
ished capacity outright, the court will then have to reconcile Gould
with previously established precedent.
If the court is sincere in its rejection of diminished capacity,
then allowing consideration of defendant's mental impairment
when he is charged with murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty
might be justifiable. The court could have weighed the traditional

134. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Podlaski, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 427, 385 N.E.2d
1379; Commonwealth v. Monsen, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 309, 385 N .E.2d 984; Com
monwealth v. Lacy, 371 Mass. 363, 358 N.E.2d 419 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Appleby, 358 Mass. 407, 265 N.E.2d 485 (1970) (cases which hold that there is no
specific intent element to murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty).
135. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1273, 405 N .E.2d at 938 (Quirico, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part).
136. See notes 91-135 supra and accompanying text for an analysis of the im
pact on Massachusetts law of the adoption of the doctrine of diminished capacity.
137. Justice Quirico stated that the majority decision
opens the door for any defendant to escape the legislative mandate of a life
sentence without benefit of parole for the crime of murder committed with
extreme atrocity or cruelty by his resort to the simple device of raising a rea
sonable doubt whether he acted under the influence of drugs or intoxicating
liquor in committing an alleged brutal or savage murder. Cr., .e.g., Common
wealth v. Podlaski . ...
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1273,405 N.E.2d at 938 (Qui rico, J., concurring in part & dis
senting in part).
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factor 138 of the accused's indifference to his victim's suffering more
heavily than the other factors associated with extreme atrocity or
cruelty to make it determinative of the issue. 139 The court in fact
did stress the defendant's indifference. to his victim's pain in its
"logical relevance"14o argument. 141 Furthermore, when the addi
tion of specific intent is discounted, the new jury instruction that
an impaired mind may be considered in determining extreme
atrocity or cruelty142 can only relate to a defendant's indifference to
the victim's suffering since that is the only traditional factor that fo
cuses subjectively upon the defendant. 143 All other traditional fac
tors focus objectively upon the defendant's actions,144 or they focus
upon the victim both objectively and subjectively.145
Weighing one factor more heavily than the others, however, is
contrary to the established method of determining the issue of ex
treme atrocity or cruelty. Normally, no single element can prove
atrocity or cruelty. As stated in Comrrwnwealth v. Podlaski,146
"The importance of a particular factor bearing on the possibility of
extreme atrocity or cruelty varies from case to case" and where a
particular factor is absent the prosecution has to "prove its case by
relying on other factors. "147 Furthermore, the model jury instruc
tion proposed by the court oddly omits the defendant's indifference
to his victim's suffering from its list of "traditional factors" to be
considered. 148 Therefore, should the court continue to deny adop
tion of diminished capacity, it is not likely that Gould will be inter
preted to mean that the factor of the defendant's indifference to his
victim's suffering should be weighed more heavily than the other
traditional factors of extreme atrocity or cruelty.
138. For a list of the traditional factors of murder with extreme atrocity or cru
elty, see note 71 supra and accompanying text.
139. For example, if the defendant is found to be indifferent to his victim's suf
fering, the jury should consider whether that indifference was overborne by the de
fendant's mental impairment.
140. See 365 A.2d at 85, which is discussed in notes 107-10 supra and accompa
nying text.
141. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1265, 405 N .E.2d at 934.
142. The text of the proposed jury instruction is stated in note 76 supra.
143. A subjective inquiry makes the defendant's state of mind relevant to the
consideration of extreme atrocity or cruelty.
144. See note 71 supra and accompanying text for the list of traditional factors.
An objective inquiry would render the defendant's state of mind irrelevant.
145. Objective factors relating to the victim are "consciousness" and "extent of
physical injury," while the subjective factor is the victim's degree of suffering.
146.' 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 427, 385 N .E.2d 1379 (1979).
147. Id. at 439,385 N.E.2d at 1386.
148. See note 76 supra for the text of the proposed jury instruction.
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The more probable interpretation of Gould is that the su
preme judicial court is defining an entirely new defense that re
duces criminal culpability by reason of mental impairment for the
crime of murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty, even in the ab
sence of a specific intent element. Since the court did not attempt
to refute the premise that there is no specific intent element to the
crime,149 a finding of severe mental impairment should exonerate
the defendant because such a finding should work under the
McHoul test to negate general criminal intent, thus rendering de
fendant unaccountable for his criminal actions. 1SO The court held,
however, that a finding of severe mental impairment would only
reduce the degree of conviction. 151 In the absence of the addition
of specific intent, the language of the opinion implies that the new
mental impairment defense affects only the degree of murder of
which the defendant should, in all fairness, be convicted. 1s2
149. The supreme judicial court may be said to agree impliedly that there is no
specific intent element for two reasons. First, it cites as support Commonwealth v.
Gilbert, 165 Mass. at 4S, 42 N.E. at 336, which flatly rejects the idea that murder
with extreme atrocity or cruelty has a specific intent element. See the discussion of
Gilbert in notes 66-70 supra and accompanying text. The court's reliance on Gilbert
becomes even more significant when considered in conjunction with the court's
readiness in Gould to overrule precedent with which it now disagrees. See 1980.
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1263, 40S N.E.2d at 933; notes 64-109 supra and accompanying
text.
Second, the court's rationale on the extreme atrocity or cruelty issue does not
seem to focus upon whether Gould had a specific intent to cause suffering, but
rather upon whether his mental impairment affected the means by which he chose to
inflict death. The distinction may be fine, but the implication that there is no spe
cific intent element also arises in the proposed jury instruction which focuses on ob
jective factors, and not on subjective intent. The proposed jury instruction appears in
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1267 ri.16, 40S N.E.2d at 93S n.16. If this instruction is used
upon retrial and it is found that the defendant's choice of means had been affected,
the court will determine that the murder was not committed with extreme atrocity or
cruelty. The degree of conviction thus will drop to murder in the second degree, re
gardless of how shocking or brutal the deed may have been.
Since the majority analysis does not specifically rely on the negation of spe
cific intent, it can be argued that there is still no specific intent element for the
crime of murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty, even in light of the decision to re
mand in Gould.
ISO. See notes SO-S6 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
McHoul test.
lSI. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1264-67, 40S N.E.2d at 933-3S.
lS2. Throughout this section of the opinion the court used language such as
"fairness requires that an impaired mind may also be considered ...." [d. at 126S,
40S N.E.2d at 934. Consideration of mental impairment "is essential if the jury is to
serve fully and fairly as the community's conscience ...." [d. at 1267, 40S N.E.2d at
93S. Thus, the underlying theme is based on a standard of fairness in the conviction
of a mentally impaired defendant.
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This interpretation is bolstered by the court's statement that
mental impairment is directly related to the issue of degree of
murder and indirectly related to the issue of extreme atrocity or
cruelty.153 Thus the supreme judicial court seems to be fashioning
a new kind of partial defense based on insanity that will work as
follows: if a defendant proves substantial mental impairment that
would preclude a conviction of murder in the first degree by delib
erate premeditation, he may not be convicted of first degree mur
der by means of extreme atrocity or cruelty if, in all fairness, the
circumstances of the case warrant only a second degree convic
tion. 154
By focusing on the ambiguous standard of fairness of the de
gree of conviction rather than on the intent of the defendant, the
court avoided adding a specific intent element to murder by ex
treme atrocity or cruelty yet still achieved the desired result of
insulating mentally handicapped defendants from first degree con
victions. This, indeed, may be what the court intended to accom
plish by its denial of the adoption of diminished capacity .155
153. The court stated, "Impairment of a defendant's ability to make a decision
in a normal manner may have a direct bearing on the degree of murder, and conse
quently, on the issues of extreme atrocity or cruelty." Id. at 1266-67, 405 N.E.2d at
935 (emphasis added). Thus, the focus may be on the reduction of the degree of con
viction rather than on the defendant's inability to form a newly added specific intent
element.
154. For example, assume that Dennis Gould, instead of believing himself to
be the new Messiah, thought that he was a member of the Spanish Inquisition. As
sume further that as part of his "holy mission" from God he lured his victim to his
home in order to make her renounce her sins and to save her soul. To carry out his
mission he used such unpleasant persuasion techniques as the "rack," "thumb
screws," and the "iron maiden," which resulted in his victim's death. The totality of
these circumstances, including all the evidence of Gould's long-standing history of
religious delusions, in all fairness, would continue to warrant only a conviction in
the second degree even though the manner the defendant chose to inflict death was
unduly painful and shocking because his belief that he was acting on, orders of God
affected his choice of means.
155. Some support for this proposition may be found in Commonwealth v.
Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 372 N.E.2d 246 (1978), i~ which the court, after considering
both objective and subjective factors as well as the effect of those factors on the de
fendant's state of mind, stated that the lesser conviction of murder in the second de
gree was warranted. See also Comment, supra note 41, at 812. Furthermore, the
guidelines enunciated for future jury instructions focus more upon "course of action"
than upon "peculiar mental state" because the instruction weighs the defendant's
mental impairment in the evaluation of manner, means, 'method, disproportion of
means used to inflict death, and degree of the victim's suffering. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh.
at 1267 n.16, 405 N.E.2d at 935 n.16. See note 149 supra for a discussion of the pro
posed jury instruction. Such an evaluation does not appear to be subjective, specific
intent evaluation but rather an objective, general intent evaluation of the "factors
customarily associated with extreme atrocity or cruelty." Id.
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Unfortunately, the language of the opinion dealing with ex
treme atrocity or cruelty is not sufficiently explicit to make this
proposition the most logical inference arising from the holding. The
first inference that can be drawn from the opinion is that the doc
trine of diminished capacity, expressly rejected by the court, was
actually applied to the crime of murder with extreme atrocity or
cruelty. Such application is tantamount to adding a specific intent
element to that crime.
Whether the supreme judicial court applied the doctrine of di
minished capacity to the crime of murder with extreme atrocity or
cruelty or whether the court was fashioning a new mental impair
ment defense based on fairness, the result is the same for the de
fendant: his conviction is reduced from first to second degree mur
der. In either of these events, Gould represents a major change in
Massachusetts law. Prior to Gould, when a murder was committed
with extremely cruel or atrocious means, McHoul would have al
lowed a verdict of either not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty
of first degree murder. A lesser verdict of guilty would have been
impermissible. 156 Thus, it is evident that no matter what avenue 157
the court takes in the future in interpreting Gould, this decision
flatly rejects the basic premise of McHoul that insanity is an all-or
nothing defense.
It appears from the language of the opinion that the supreme
judicial court has adopted the doctrine of diminished capacity and
has applied that doctrine to the crime of murder with extreme
atrocity or cruelty. The application of a doctrine which is premised
upon the negation of specific intent necessarily implies that the
crime contains a specific intent element. Thus, the decision either
will have to be clarified or will come to stand for the proposition
that there is a specific intent element to the crime of murder with
extreme atrocity or cruelty. This is a necessary result of the court's
focus upon mental impairment since the use of impairment to re
duce the degree of conviction under the doctrine of diminished ca
pacity can be relevant only to the issue of specific intent.
Should future clarification of the decision repudiate application
of the doctrine and the addition of specific intent, however, the de
cision would appear to be creating a new partial insanity defense
based upon the fairness of the degree of conviction in light of the
totality of the circumstances of the case.
156. See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of McHoul.
157. See notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of the
three avenues open to the court in interpreting Gould in the future.
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CONCLUSION

In Comrrwnwealth v. Gould,158 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court adopted a liberal approach to the doctrine of dimin
ished capacity that applies that doctrine to all crimes involving spe
cific intent. Although the court expressly denied taking such ac
tion, its denial must be ignored for many reasons. First, the jury
instruction suggested by the court as to the issue of deliberate pre
meditation 159 is a classic example of the doctrine. The instruction
informs the jury that if it is found that the defendant killed the vic
tim, but that he was incapable of deliberately premeditating be
cause of his mental impairment, the defendant is guilty of second
degree murder.160 The court also overruled a line of Massachusetts
cases that had expressly rejected the doctrine of diminished capac
ity161 and instead relied upon decisions handed down in other ju
risdictions which have adopted the doctrine. 162 Furthermore, the
court in effect rejected the McHoul premise that insanity is an all
or-nothing defense 163 by holding that a finding of mental impair
ment does not exonerate a defendant but instead may reduce his
conviction from first to second degree murder.
The supreme judicial court took an indirect approach toward
mitigating the plight of mentally handicapped defendants by ap
plying the doctrine of diminished capacity while denying its use. If
the court is going to use diminished capacity, it should acknowl
edge that the doctrine is viable and avoid confusing the courts be
low as to the precise extent of the doctrine. Perhaps the supreme
judicial court's denial was an attempt to limit application of the
doctrine to cases involving a defendant with a longstanding history
of severe mental illness. But if this is so, the decision's impact on
the essential elements of the crime of murder with extreme atroc
ity or cruelty is further confused: the court's apparent application
of diminished capacity to murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty
implies the addition of a specific intent element into that crime.
IS8. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 12S3, 40S N.E.2d at 927.
IS9. See note 124 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the jury in
struction which should be "in accordance with Commonwealth v. Delle Chiaie." Id.
at 1264, 40S N.E.2d at 933.
160. Id. at 1261, 40S N.E.2d at 932.
161. Id. at 1263, 40S N.E.2d at 933.
162. Id. at 1262 & n.13, 1263, 40S N.E.2d 932 & n.13. See notes 104-106 supra
and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's reliance on United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d at 969.
163. See notes SO-S2 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of McHoul.
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The court, however, maintains that it has not added such a
specific intent element and cites as supporting precedent Massa
chusetts cases interpreting that crime as having no specific intent
requirement. 164 Therefore, should the court explain this decision
further in the future, a new defense of reduced culpability by rea
son of insanity may be created that focuses not on specific intent
but on the fairness of convicting a mentally impaired defendant of
first degree murder under the totality of the circumstances. 16S
James J. Pancotti

164. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1265-67, 405 N.E.2d at 934-35; see note 149 supra
for an argument in support of this assertion by the court.
165. See notes 149-55 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the "fair
ness" defense.
'

